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SOCIAL INSURANCE AND MANPOWER POLICY 
IN THE SOVIET UNION 
HE PRECISE ROLE which social insurance ought to 
1 y 'n a socialist state became a subject of hot debate Tpa  
soon after the Bolshevik revolution. In one of its very first 
official proclamations, the Bolshevik government restated 
the grandiose social insurance principles laid down by Lenin 
at the 1912 congress of the Bolshevik party in Prague. But 
the practical application of these principles in a highly dis- 
organized economy raised many difficult problems. As a 
consequence, Soviet social insurance underwent constant re- 
organization for several years. Nevertheless, by 1921, at the 
beginning of the NEP period, some of the controversial is- 
sues, like the character of the administrative structure, had 
been temporarily settled. The principal objective of the sys- 
tem was then what it is primarily in Western capitalist coun- 
tries today, the income protection of wage and salary earn- 
ers and their families. 
The advent of central planning, however, again raised cer- 
tain fundamental questions regarding the objectives of so- 
cial insurance. While the economy was being prepared for 
a basic reorganization aiming at swift industrialization and 
rapid productivity increases, every major economic and so- 
cial institution was put to the test of how it could most con- 
tribute to this central goal. The test for the existing social 
insurance system was no longer its adequacy as a welfare 
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measure but its efficiency as an instrument of manpower 
policy. In this respect it was found wanting and subjected to 
severe criticism. The pasty decreed (Directive of September 
28, 1929) that social insurance resources be mobilized for 
the struggle for higher labor productivity and stricter disci- 
pline. Thus, in the Soviet Union social insurance became a 
lever in the state planning mechanism, a means to achieve 
goals only remotely related to individual and family welfare. 
To the conventional welfare tasks of social insurance, the 
Soviet leaders added the task of influencing the quantity, 
quality, and allocation of labor resources. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine briefly in what 
ways Soviet social insurance can be said to have contributed 
to the drive for rapid economic growth. In a sense, this is 
asking to what extent social insurance in the Soviet Union 
has paid for itself. If it can be made to pay for itself, the 
Soviet formula may appear rather attractive to newly de- 
veloping countries facing the social problems of industrial- 
ism. In the short time at my disposal, I naturally cannot at- 
tempt to analyze all the productivity aspects of a scheme as 
complex as a comprehensive social security system. The 
Soviet system covers pensions for old age, permanent dis- 
ability, and survivorship; temporary benefits for sickness, 
accidents, and maternity; family allowances; special grants 
for births, burials, and rehabilitation, as well as subsidized 
passes to rest homes, health resorts, and children's institu- 
tions. I shall restrict myself to a survey of the labor-supply 
and productivity implications of some key areas of the sys- 
tem. These areas are ( I )  the choice of risks to be covered, 
(2)  administrative practices, ( 3 )  the relation of social insur- 
ance benefits to capital foimation, and (4)  benefit scales 
and eligibility conditions, The economic significance of deci- 
sions taken in these areas, however, depends not only on the 
character of the insurance system, but to a considerable ex- 
tent on the economic and political environment. I t  is appro- 
priate, therefore, to preface the examination of the social 
insurance system with an outline of leading features of Soviet 
institutions which tend to facilitate, or interfere with, the 
achievement of production goals through social insurance. 
The first of these institutional features is a centrally di- 
rected economy. By eliminating the risk of mass unemploy- 
ment, a centrally directed economy facilitates the institution 
of a social insurance system which penalizes irregular work 
habits. The state takes the position that it guarantees a "job" 
for anyone willing to work, and hence it can afford to penal- 
ize those who fail to become employed. Furthennore, where 
both wages and benefits are centrally planned, the planning 
authorities can treat them to some extent as substitute folms 
of remuneration. This enables them not only to pay higher 
wage and benefit rates in certain occupations, industries, and 
locations to which workers are to be attracted, but also to 
exercise control over the workers' saving-consumption pat- 
tern. 
The second institutional feature to be noted briefly relates 
to social insurance financing. The Soviet method of financing 
makes it administratively easier to manipulate the system 
for productivity and discipline purposes than would be the 
case, for instance, under the American system. The American 
system is internally financed. This means that it has to be 
planned in such a fashion that benefits and administrative 
costs which have to be paid in any period are covered by 
past and current social security taxes and interest earned 
on accumulated funds. Moreover, in the American case the 
incentive problem is further complicated by the fact that 
the workers pay part of these taxes directly as a payroll 
deduction. The remainder is derived from a payroll tax on 
the employer, and the incidence of this tax falls probably 
partially on the worker in the fonn of higher prices. The 
Soviet system levies no social insurance tax on the worker 
and builds up no fund. Each year, the state provides the 
income needed, partly from general revenue, but mainly 
from a payroll tax on enterprises and establishments. This 
tax need not affect work incentives since the state is theo- 
retically free to allocate the costs as it sees fit. Because bene- 
fits are not tied to an earmarked source of revenue, the 
Soviet method of financing leaves the state more freedom 
to alter the level and structure of benefits and eligibility 
conditions to suit its purposes at various times. 
The third institutional feature worth noting is the role of 
the trade unions. The major purpose of the reorganization 
of the administrative structure of the social insurance sys- 
tem in the early 1930's was to give the trade unions the 
power to adjudicate, administer, and regulate all social in- 
surance benefits payable to employed individuals and their 
families. This was done at a time when the trade unions 
were deprived of their last vestige of independent power to 
regulate wages and working conditions, while at the same 
time, the party asked them to play a vigorous role in the 
promotion of a production zeal among the rapidly expand- 
ing industrial work force. It was clearly recognized that trade 
unions would not only be better suited than state organs 
to carry out the productivity and labor-discipline objectives 
of social insurance, but also that the administration of wel- 
fare programs would raise the unions' authority with the 
masses. In all matters relating to his welfare, the worker was 
expected to look first to his union, the same union which 
bore the responsibility for the promotion of productivity and 
labor discipline. 
The fourth and last institutional feature to be mentioned 
is the ideological significance of Soviet social insurance. 0f- 
ficially, all welfare payments are treated as unilateral gifts 
of the state to which all citizens are entitled by law. Soviet 
spokesmen never miss an opportunity to argue that, in con- 
trast to the contributory insurance systems of capitalist coun- 
tries, their free benefits are striking evidence of "socialist 
humanism7' and of the state's deep concern for the welfare 
of the individual. In a country where the state determines 
both wages and prices, it is meaningless to treat benefits as 
a gift, since the state could just as easily pay higher wages 
and collect contributions. The question which has to be con- 
sidered is the conflict between the productivity objectives 
and the ideological stress on "socialist humanism" and "free" 
benefits. Can the state use the system as means to push in- 
dividuals to work harder and at the same time have them 
be grateful for a free gift? Heavy propaganda may help to 
achieve such divergent goals, but many of us will remain 
skeptical. 
This ideological question only accentuates a limitation 
which is inherent in the attempt to use any welfare scheme 
for incentive purposes. In whatever way the system is shaped 
to stimulate incentive, it has to remain a meaningful form of 
economic protection. It is generally feared by those who re- 
ject manipulations of social insurance programs for nonin- 
surance purposes, that benefit levels and eligibility condi- 
tions dictated by incentive considerations may have disas- 
trous effects on the protective value of a program. The Soviet 
experience from the 1930's to the 1950's provides ample 
ground for such fears. Those who need protection most are 
often those least capable of earning it. In an all-out drive 
for higher productivity and stricter discipline, the welfare 
of individuals and families is easily relegated to a position 
of secondary importance, something which must not be al- 
lowed to stand in the way of the "greater" goals of the Party 
and the "People." 
The institutional features I have just discussed are the 
general framework in which Soviet social insurance operates. 
Let us turn now to an examination of some specific aspects 
of the insurance system which are relevant from a labor and 
manpower policy point of view. 
The first area is the choice of the risks to be covered. No 
sound social insurance system should provide opportunities 
For malingering, but neither should concern with potential 
abuse categorically eliminate legitimate forms of protection. 
A general principle which underlies the Soviet approach is 
that no income-maintenance payments be made to any able- 
bodied person of working age, regardless of the cause of the 
loss of income. Stipends paid to students could be considered 
an exception to this general rule, which conforms to the citi- 
zen's right and duty to work as stipulated by Article 12 of 
the U.S.S.R. constitution. In practice, adherence to this prin- 
ciple tends to put the duty to work before other social con- 
siderations, such as protection of family life by keeping a 
mother in the home rather than in the factory. Its most ob- 
vious results are the abolishment of unemployment insur- 
ance, restricted survivorship payments, and the scaling of 
permanent disability benefits not to the income loss incurred 
but to a disabled person's capacity to help himself. The most 
important restriction placed on survivorship pensions is that 
these payments are made to able-bodied widows of working 
age only if they have in their care a child under age 8, as 
compared with age 18 in the United States. 
Not all consequences of the principle cited above are 
negative. For instance, it is consistent with the payment of 
pensions to persons who qualify for retirement benefits but 
continue to work. Indeed, the Soviet government tries to 
keep aged persons capable of work in the work force by pay- 
ing their pension in addition to their wages. This is one area 
where the Soviet concern with the retention of the work 
force contrasts sharply with the traditional American ap- 
proach of using social security to help remove aged persons 
from the labor market and improve employment opportuni- 
ties for younger people. 
The abolishment of unemployment insurance requires 
brief comment. The Soviet Union abandoned its unemploy- 
ment insurance program when it began the reorganization 
of its system in 1930. The reason given was that unemploy- 
ment insurance was no longer needed since unemployment 
had been eliminated. At the time many criticisms were ex- 
pressed over the existing system's alleged support of loafers 
and idlers. In most countries unemployment insurance is 
designed not merely to maintain income but to enable the 
unemployed worker to hold out for what the law considers a 
suitable job in an acceptable locality. In this sense, unem- 
ployment insurance may be paid out, as a result of frictional 
unemployment, even when there is full employment and a 
general shortage of labor. The abandonment of the unern- 
ployment insurance program in the Soviet Union, especially 
since it came shortly after the enactment of severe measures 
against unemployed workers who refused job or retraining 
offers, was thus clearly a means to put pressure on workers 
who are between jobs and to discourage them from delaying 
re-employment. Lack of support while unemployed should 
increase labor mobility, both in the sense of stimulating the 
worker's desire to find a job and in the sense of lessening his 
resistance to accepting an undesirable job in an undesirable 
place. Lack of support also reduces the worker's ability to 
pay moving expenses, which might keep him from moving 
where the planners do not want him, and tends to keep him 
where they put him. This kind of pressure does not neces- 
sarily contribute to overall productivity, especially if skilled 
workers should be forced to take unskilled jobs. However, 
in the unstable Soviet labor market of the 1930 '~~  it probably 
facilitated the state's recruitment and distribution of the 
many new entrants in to the industrial labor force. 
Related to the choice of risks is the kind of services to be 
provided by the system. One of the outstanding character- 
istics of social insurance related programs in the Soviet Union 
is an emphasis on services designed to strengthen the main- 
tenance, expansion, and utilization of manpower resources. 
This includes an emphasis on health care for industrial work- 
ers, rehabilitation and retraining of incapacitated workers, 
dietary meals at factories for special groups, free and partial- 
ly free passes to rest homes and resorts, and provision of 
factory nurseries, kindergartens, and summer camps for chil- 
dren. These services for children are essential if many moth- 
ers are to be full-time factory workers, which is the case in 
the Soviet Union. The other services are part of the effort to 
"mobilize all labor reserves for the production battle." Al- 
though there is good evidence that in many instances prac- 
tice falls far short of stated ideals, in time many of these serv- 
ices are likely to improve considerably. 
The area of social insurance administration also provides 
important opportunities to carry out manpower policy ob- 
jectives. This is done in two major ways: first, through the 
discretion left to the trade unions in awarding the benefits 
provided by law, and, second, through the coordination of 
social insurance administration with measures taken in the 
areas of industrial relations, industrial safety, industrial medi- 
cine and sanitation, vocational rehabilitation and retsaining, 
and institutions for children, aged, and invalids, 
Social insurance laws are typically complex, and the Soviet 
laws certainly reinforce this genera1 rule. As a result, ad- 
ministrators often have some discretion in the determination 
of a particular individual's eligibility, in the calculation of 
his benefit level, and especially in the promptness with which 
a given case is handled. Most countries make efforts to mini- 
mize this discretion, but the opposite seems to be the case 
in the Soviet Union. The Soviet leaders decreed in the 1930's 
that social insurance administration should aim deliberately 
at preferential treatment for shock workers and workers in 
certain essential occupations and should discipline unsatis- 
factory workers. Preferential treatment for favored groups 
was already built into the laws in the form of higher benefit 
rates, but the trade unions had further power to discriminate 
when it came to the distribution of passes to resorts and rest 
homes, and to pioneer camps for children. On the negative 
side, the unions were authorized in 1933 to withdraw the 
right to social insurance benefits from "drifters, trouble 
makers, and idlers." The trade union social insurance com- 
mission may also deny cash sickness benefits to any indi- 
vidual who does not adhere to the regime prescribed for 
him by the doctor. There is no evidence readily available to 
indicate how much use has been made of these provisions. 
There has been a significant shift in the objectives of 
Soviet social insurance administration in recent years. Under 
the unsettled conditions accompanying the influx of large 
numbers of peasants and other workers into rapidly expand- 
ing industries during the 1930's, the trade unions were di- 
rected to combat high turnover rates and to reward special 
groups, such as shock workers and workers in high priority 
industries. In recent years, with a more highly developed 
administrative structure, under more settled industrial condi- 
tions, and with a growing labor shortage, the stress has been 
mainly on the reduction of sickness, accidents, and absentee- 
ism, and on the stimulation of productivity through the pro- 
motion of health and rehabilitation. A further sign of a 
maturing industrial society, with a growing shortage of labor, 
appears to be the recent urgent appeals to the trade union 
social insurance administrators to find ways to utilize the 
skills of retired workers. These tasks, in the Soviet Union, 
are carried out chiefly by the local social insurance activists. 
They carry on a vast program to keep the worker on the job 
and healthy-a program which ranges from putting pressure 
on doctors who are thought to be too free with sickness cer- 
tificates to improvement of day nurseries so that working 
mothers will have no cause for absenteeism due to inade- 
quately cared for children. 
We come now to the role social insurance can play in the 
area of capital formation. One of the important aspects of a 
planned economy is public control of the rate of saving and 
capital fo~mation. Social insurance can be fitted into this con- 
trol pattern. Through its policy of low wages combined with 
rather comprehensive social insurance benefits, the Soviet 
state deprives the worker of the ability to save but to some 
extent, which is difficult to determine, relieves him of the 
necessity to save for old age, interruptions in the capacity to 
work, and similar circumstances, The state insists on doing 
the saving for these exigencies on behalf of the individual 
through the social insurance system. This enables the state 
to increase the amount of saving possible in the economy, 
or at the very least it makes possible the achievement of a 
given rate of saving with less hardship than would otherwise 
be the case. If all the workers' income were in the form of 
wages, which for the sake of efficiency have to be related to 
work performance rather than need, the prevailing low wage 
policy would be extremely hard on families with many chil- 
dren, aged parents, or an incapacitated wage earner. By mak- 
ing direct payments to meet these exigencies, social insur- 
ance alleviates these hardships and makes a low wage and 
high saving rate policy more acceptable. This may be re- 
garded as a method of income redistribution which makes 
more bearable the burdens of forced industrial growth. It  is 
a system which keeps most people at a low income level but 
avoids the potentially dangerous extremes of social distress. 
The last question to be considered is concerned with the 
incentive implications of the benefit scales and eligibility 
conditions in Soviet social insurance. This question has really 
two aspects. First, we may ask whether Soviet benefit scales 
and eligibility conditions induce individuals to work harder 
at any point of time and over their lifetime, whether they 
attract and keep people in the work force, whether they in- 
duce people to take jobs at times and places they would 
otherwise decline, and whether they encourage regular work 
habits. Secondly, we may ask whether this form of planning, 
that is, the direction of factors of production via manipula- 
tion of social insurance payments and promises is carried 
out in an econoinicaLly rational manner. Benefit and eligi- 
bility differentiation may not have gone far enough; on the 
other hand, it might be more economical to treat everybody 
alike and to rely mainly on differential wages for incentive 
purposes. 
Most Soviet benefit scales and eligibility conditions have 
clearly been designed to promote the incentive objectives 
listed above, but the economic value of this approach can- 
not be readily estimated. The incentive to work is encouraged 
by relating the level of benefits to the level of wages, which 
is also partly the case in the United States, although there 
are some interesting differences between the two countries. 
Soviet retirement benefits for the average wage earner, even 
without various kinds of service supplements, are a higher 
percentage of wages than similar benefits under U.S. social 
security. This is made necessary in part by the low wage 
level in the U.S.S.R. Nevertheless, the Soviet system pays a 
lower percentage of wages in survivorship benefits than the 
American program. This reflects the Soviet pressure to keep 
individuals at work. Workers in industries that were thought 
to contribute most to the growth of social productivit)r used 
to be singled out for preferential treatment. Now, much the 
same effect is achieved by giving workers in difficult, hot, 
dangerous, and underground occupations preferential bene- 
fit scales and preferential eligibility conditions. To encourage 
workers to extend their working-life span, a benefit bonus 
is paid to those who exceed a specified number of years of 
work, the number of years depending on the industry. Tem- 
porary disability benefits are tied to the length of the over- 
all service record as well as to the length of uninterrupted 
service. In this manner those who quit voluntarily and do 
not become quickly re-employed and those who get fired are 
penalized. Finally, workers who do not belong to trade 
unions are entitled to temporary disability benefits at only 
one-half the rate of union members. Refused admittance or 
expulsion from the union may be costly for the worker. 
It is extremely difficuIt to evaluate the overall impact of 
Soviet social insurance. The fact that its aims and methods 
would not be acceptable in most Western countries is not a 
reliable guide. There seems, on the contrary, to be wide- 
spread approval of the system within the Soviet Union, and 
official pronouncements leave no doubt that the leaders 
take immense pride in the care they bestow upon the work- 
ing population. 
